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2Executive summary
The Communication assesses the state of play of the WTO Doha Development Agenda
negotiations in the light of developments since Doha and of the Cancun Ministerial Meeting,
and outlines how the EU could best contribute to a successful relaunch of negotiations. It is
based on the reflections and consultations that the Commission has engaged in since Cancun.
The Communication concludes that the basic rationale for the DDA remains valid, and that
the EU’s objectives, set out in earlier Council conclusions, should be maintained. It also
concludes that the EU should support the early re-launch of the DDA and should, together
with other WTO Members, participate constructively in efforts to this end. The
Communication does however suggest that, in order for a relaunch to be successful, all WTO
Members must be prepared to adjust or refine their approach in a number of specific areas.
As far as the EU is concerned, it is suggested that we now be ready to explore alternative
approaches to negotiating the Singapore issues of investment, competition, trade facilitation
and transparency in government procurement, possibly through removing them from the
single undertaking of the negotiations and through negotiating them as plurilateral agreements
if necessary. While maintaining our substantive objectives, it also suggests a slight adjustment
of the approach on trade and environment and geographical indications aimed at reducing
reticence to negotiations in these areas.
On agriculture, the Communication confirms the EU’s continued readiness to make
significant commitments provided that our trading partners also show real movement. A
specific initiative on cotton within the context of the agriculture negotiations is also proposed.
On services and non agricultural market access, the Communication suggests the EU should
maintain its high level of ambition, and that other delegations should make a real contribution
to negotiations according to their capacities.
The Communication also proposes that on rules for Anti-dumping, Subsidies and Regional
Trade Agreements, the EU should seek ambitious results, while on a range of trade and
development issues, we should work for outcomes that genuinely support the integration of
developing countries as opposed to measures that perpetuate the development gap.
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Following the failure of the Cancun conference, WTO Members, in particular the EU, have
devoted considerable time in trying to comprehend the reasons for that failure.Mature
reflection suggests a mixture of reasons. One was certainly procedural: in some respects the
Cancun meeting began on track, and only fell apart at the last moment. But there are also
solid grounds for believing that there were serious underlying problems behind the failure of
Cancun, which will have to be addressed if the Doha Development Agenda is going to
succeed as a negotiation. Developments such as the emergence of new groups such as the G20
and the G90, driven by concerns that their priorities were not being given sufficient attention;
the reluctance of a number of Members either to engage in further trade liberalisation or to
extend the WTO rule-book; differences in substance that remained too wide to be bridged in
the time available; the importance (and fear) of China and her huge exporting potential; and
systemic problems in the operation of the WTO itself cannot be ignored or brushed aside.
Given this mix of factors, and indeed, the dramatic and important nature of the Cancun
collapse, many have also spent an equally considerable amount of time in assessing how and
under what conditions the DDA negotiations could be re-launched. For our part, over the last
two months the Commission has engaged in an extensive process of reflection and
consultation with Member States, in the 133 Committee and elsewhere; with the European
Parliament; with a broad range of civil society representatives (NGOs, business and trade
union representatives); and with our third country partners, in order to better understand views
and build a sense of what needs to be done if the process launched at Doha is to move forward
again. The Commission has, in carrying out this review, posed a series of general questions:
about the scope for pursuing new rule making in the WTO, and the relationship of “rule
making” to “market access” negotiations; about the extent to which more emphasis should be
given in the future to bilateral and regional trade negotiations; on the best means to further the
developmental objectives of the WTO and the Doha agenda; and on the need for improving
the workings of the WTO as an organisation. A brief word on each of these questions, and the
conclusions we have drawn following our consultations:
– On “rule-making” and its relation to “market access” negotiations, it is clear to
the Commission that the EU should continue to insist on a strong continuing
rules-making component in the multilateral trading system. If we are serious
about “harnessing globalisation”, we cannot dismiss the importance of rules in
the WTO or those developed in other areas of international policy making. In
any case, existing rules in areas such as agriculture or trade defence, for
example, show how fundamentally intertwined rule-making and market access
continue to be within the WTO. Further rule making accompanied by improved
market access should help to sustain higher rates of global economic growth
and poverty reduction, in addition to helping developing countries better
integrate into the world economy.
– On the question of balance between multilateral and bilateral / regional
negotiations, the results of our consultations are very clear: multilateral
negotiations should remain the European priority. There is widespread support
for this notion in all parts of the Commission’s authorizing environment –
Member States, the Parliament, business, trade unions and civil society.
– On the question of development, much has been done before Doha, at Doha
and since to ensure that the new Round supports development objectives. But
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of the benefits that the Doha Development Agenda can bring to them, notably
in terms of further market opening in sectors like agriculture. Most obviously,
there has been concern over the impact of further multilateral trade opening on
the preferential market access that some developing countries enjoy in a
number of developed, “northern” markets. Some developing countries have
also expressed reservations about engaging themselves in further liberalisation,
or of adopting stronger multilateral rules.
Against this background, the Commission has sought to identify clearly what
kinds of outcomes will genuinely promote development: what in other words a
“development Round” should and should not be about. In our view, the WTO
is not a structurally unfair system that needs to be rebalanced. We believe that
the WTO and previous Rounds have not worked against the interest of
developing countries. Nor should the Round be geared to removing all
responsibility from all developing countries to contribute to a successful
market-opening outcome, including the important dimension of improved
“south-south” trade. And it should not be ignoring the necessity to update the
WTO rule-book (since developing countries as much as  any can benefit from
the security that multilateral rules provide), or absolving developing countries
from new WTO rules, which would create precisely the same two tier WTO
which many developing countries have expressed fears about. The Doha
Development Agenda has instead to enhance further the integration of
developing countries, particularly the poorest of them, into the world economy,
through progressive market opening and the progressive assumption of
stronger rules, in keeping with the implementation capacities of developing
countries. The biggest developmental gains will, after all, come from ambitious
trade opening and the strengthening of multilateral rules. The DDA thus has to
ensure that the negotiations more generally work fully in the interests of
development. These arguments are set out at greater length below.
– Finally, and more briefly, on the question of WTO reform, the Commission has
consulted widely on what specific improvements are needed to the functioning
of the WTO. We have concluded that a relatively modest, but feasible, package
of reforms, focusing first and foremost on the preparation and management of
Ministerial conferences, and other means to improve the efficiency and
inclusiveness of WTO negotiations, is the way to move forward. The
Commission will raise further, more systemic questions in due course with the
Consultative Group on WTO reform established by the WTO Director General.
During this period of reflection, the October European Council also invited the Commission
both to reflect on the EU strategy and to explore with key WTO players the possibility for
future progress in the DDA. At the same time, the European Council clearly laid down a
framework for this reflection: the unchanged EU's commitment to the multilateral approach to
trade policy, on the one hand, and the commitment by all WTO Members as an indispensable
condition for any successful resumption of negotiations, on the other hand.
So in concluding this process of reflection and consultation, the Commission arrives firmly at
one single basic premise: that the WTO must remain the principal forum for trade opening
and the strengthening of trade rules, as the multilateral approach to co-operation on trade
matters, based on the principles of transparency and non discrimination, remains the most
effective and legitimate means to manage the globalisation process and trade relations
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the WTO will continue to have a critical role to play in the management of globalisation and
in the pursuit of sustainable development in all its aspects. The EU for its part should aim at
improving further the coherence between the WTO and these other organisations in the
interests of more coherent international governance in the economic, social and environmental
fields.
If so, where next? It is clear that there are relatively few EU constituencies who are opposed
to any form of multilateral trade round. We rule the “no Round” option out as unfeasible,
undesirable and out of line with basic EU interests. But should we conclude that the Doha
Development Agenda needs to be closed, in order to start afresh with a wholly new mandate,
and that we should then look for an early WTO Ministerial meeting to launch a new Round ?
This, too, we reject. It would be a recipe for a major delay in the conclusion of any Round,
indeed even a launch of a new Round itself could be highly problematic over the next year.
Moreover, we believe that the Doha Declaration itself remains valid. The initial justification
for launching the Doha Round remains unaffected by developments before or at Cancun. The
negotiations still offer great potential to foster long-term economic growth, to stimulate trade
and investment, and to promote sustainable development, and the DDA has an important role
to play in our efforts to attain the Millennium Development Goals.
Our conclusion therefore is that the EU should support the early re-launch of the DDA and
should, together with other WTO Members, participate constructively in efforts to this end.
Clearly, however, future negotiations will not be successful if we or others ignore the lessons
of Cancun or pretend that we can simply pick up the issues where they were left on 14
September without any further reflection. As stressed by the European Council, all Members
of the WTO have to be willing to reflect on their approach and come back to the negotiations
in a constructive spirit, one that demonstrates anew a basic commitment to multilateralism.
The EU, for its part, both before and at Cancun, moved, often repeatedly, on all important
issues, many of which are very sensitive for European interests. It should continue to do so.
However, movement in a negotiation is not an aim in itself, but a tool to facilitate a
compromise where our own interests are also met: we do need, therefore, commensurate
movement from other participants, which was and still appears, unfortunately, by and large
insufficient or absent altogether. Negotiation is a two way street.
The process of reflection that the Commission has carried out so far suggests that the
fundamental objectives that the EU set for itself before Seattle, as defined in the Council
Conclusions of October 1999 and re-visited and re-affirmed in subsequent Council
Conclusions, have stood the test of time. What has appeared in need of some review is our
strategy to achieve those objectives: the need to refine and sharpen our negotiating approach
in a number of areas; take account of the manner in which discussions have developed over
the past few months or at Cancun itself; and take account of developments within the EU
itself (notably the successful mid-term review of the CAP). On this basis, we should be able
to continue to play a full and constructive role in any re-launch of negotiations.
The remainder of this Communication therefore identifies, in relation to the different areas of
the DDA, what is needed from ourselves and from our trading partners - who also need to
show their commitment to the negotiating process. For our part this Communication takes into
account the discussions held with all European constituencies, including in particular the
Member States in the 133 Committee and Members of the European Parliament. Orientation
discussions have been already held on a number of topics. The paper in particular suggests
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resumption of work.
Agriculture
Negotiations on Agriculture were launched in Doha on a broad and balanced platform
covering substantial reductions in trade-distorting support, in export subsidies, improvement
in market access, special treatment for developing countries and non-trade concerns, as part of
a wider, single undertaking of the Doha Development Agenda.
The EU has from the outset taken a pro-active role in the negotiations and unreservedly
supported the implementation of the Doha Declaration. The recently adopted reform of the
CAP and proposals for reform in other sectors are the best proof that for the EU the path
towards less trade-distorting support need not be an external constraint, but a desired policy
orientation. Internally, the path chosen meets the domestic challenges of promoting
competitiveness for EU agriculture while at the same time meeting the highest environmental,
quality and animal welfare standards that our citizens expect. Externally, the reform process
in turn enables the EU to contribute to the Doha negotiations through an approach based on
further, significant trade opening and support for sustainable development. The process of
CAP reform thus in a sense has anticipated on the achievement of the Doha objectives. It is
now essential that others also follow the path of reform, at least as the result of the
negotiations.
Rather than camping on its initial negotiation proposals, the EU has therefore already
responded to the call for leadership from the WTO at large by demonstrating its capacity to
reform. At the demand of other Members it also presented in the latter stage of preparation of
the Cancun Ministerial a joint proposal with the US that built important bridges between
opposing positions of WTO members. The new concepts developed at that stage on how to
reduce trade-distorting domestic support, on market access and on export subsidization, are
concepts that should not be lost as they provide the foundations for a balanced and fair
outcome of the negotiations. Unfortunately the same cannot be said about many other
important players. The onus is now on them to show similar determination for real progress
leading to the successful outcome of the negotiations.
What is our position in the different areas of negotiation, and what do we believe other
countries should do to get to an agreement? First and foremost, the negotiations can only
succeed if they are faithful to the Doha Declaration. More specifically:
On domestic support, trade-distorting support should be substantially reduced from bound
levels. Conversely, support with no or little trade effects, that addresses key policy goals
crucial to the sovereign rights of Members, as is the case for green box support, cannot be
subject to any capping or reduction. The notion that we or others should reduce green box
support is unacceptable. This would amount to putting external constraints on internal policies
having no trade distorting impact.
The real focus of the negotiations should be on what distorts trade, first and foremost on the
amber box and export subsidies. The EU therefore should call for substantial reductions in the
amber box, the most trade distorting form of support that is linked to production or prices.
The de minimis threshold should also be reduced so as to keep it as a real exception. In
addition, the EU should support specific disciplines, including a cap, on blue box support,
although this is clearly less trade-distorting as it is based on fixed entitlements. Again, it
should be noted that the EU has moved in this area, and the cap of 5% of total agricultural
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others with the clear recognition of the distinction between the different trade distorting
impact of different policies.
Further on domestic support, the EU accepts that DCs should have more flexibility to address
their developmental needs, including the needs of poor farmers and the right to continue to
sustain sound rural, agricultural and food policies. But while the EU has always supported
special treatment for developing countries in the area of domestic support, it considers that
such treatment should be targeted particularly to the poorer, less competitive developing
countries as opposed to the most advanced. This appears to us the most appropriate means to
fulfil the development objectives of the Doha declaration.
On market access, further gradual, substantial trade liberalization is beneficial to all,
developed and developing countries alike. The developed countries should make the biggest
contribution to most trade liberalisation, but that will not suffice. Development of trade
among developing countries is also essential , as those are the countries where demand for
food is expected to rise, and where most of the future growth in and benefits from trade are
likely to arise.
Most WTO Members have particular sensitivities in some sectors, which explains why the
mixed UR formula/Swiss formula approach constitutes the right compromise on tariff cuts,
(which should be made starting from bound levels of tariffs), and why a special safeguard
designed to meet genuine needs is important for developed and DCs alike. On TRQs, it
should be noted that their distribution across the membership is very uneven, reflecting the
situation prevailing at the end of the Uruguay Round, and therefore proper burden sharing of
further market opening can be achieved only if all countries are put on the same footing, with
appropriate special treatment for developing countries. Preferential access for the weakest of
the DCs, in combination with sound economic policies and supply capacity, can be vital for
their integration in world markets. Ignoring this fact is ignoring the lessons of Cancun.
But while we should be ready to re-confirm what the EU is prepared to do, other countries -
including the largest and most advanced developing countries - should also provide
preferential access in their markets to the larger number of developing countries in need. The
EU’s EBA initiative should be followed by others, and we consider that in addition to the
OECD countries, the G20 should, for example, be invited to offer trade preferences to G90
countries. Last but not least, the EU should maintain its demand for an end to usurpation of
certain selected EU GIs. Failure to do so will negate valuable export potential to the EU and
other countries, which can only have a negative impact on the negotiations in this area.
As regards export competition, the EU’s position has been very clear in asking that all forms
of export competition need to be addressed in a strict, parallel manner. The EU has made very
substantial proposals in this area, such as our offer to eliminate export subsidies on a list of
products of interest to developing countries. Other Members, however, have tried to ignore
the Doha Declaration by trying to exempt their own export competition instruments from
significant, binding disciplines. Rather than attempting to re-write the Doha Declaration, other
Members should respond positively to EU initiatives, including the offer regarding export
subsidies.
In respect of non-trade concerns, the EU should continue to try to address all issues related to
agriculture trade rules rather than only the commercial aspects. Protection of the environment,
animal welfare, rural development are legitimate societal goals (cf under “Domestic support”
above). To ignore them, as some Members do, can only reduce public support for further
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forward.
On cotton, the EU should support an effective and specific solution in the WTO to the plight
of the African countries, taking in account the discussions in the Council in recent weeks. In
the framework of the agriculture negotiations, an initiative on cotton should contain three key
elements: an explicit commitment to grant duty free and quota free market access for cotton
exports from least developed countries, as the EU already provides through the “Everything
But Arms” initiative; substantial reductions of the most trade-distorting forms of domestic
support; and elimination of export subsidies within a stated timeframe. The Commission has
proposed such changes to our domestic support in the framework of reform of its Common
Market Organisation for cotton, and intends to include cotton amongst products of interest to
developing countries in the list for which EU export subsidies would be eliminated. This
initative, while being integrated within the agriculture negotiations, could receive a specific
treatment, for example a specific timeframe for implementation.
Flanking support measures should be pursued in parallel by the EU and other  partners,
including the relevant international organisations, with a view to supporting modernisation
and restructuring in the least developed cotton producing countries. The Commission will
soon follow up on the Council Conclusions of 18 November, and will propose  concrete
orientations addressing the concerns of developing countries in the area of cotton.
More generally, the Commission intends to use these ideas as an illustration of how the wider
commodities issue could be dealt with. The Commission is committed to providing input for
an EU perspective on commodities and will produce an EU action plan no later than January
2004. Within the WTO, the EU should support such commodity initiatives aiming at raising
the profile of the issue as proposed by preparatory texts to the Cancun conference.
On the Peace Clause, finally, comprehensive negotiations on agriculture, resulting in an
agreement acceptable to all Members, risks being undermined if Members use litigation in an
attempt to challenge subsidies granted consistently with the Agreement on Agriculture.
Protection for such subsidies must be maintained. Since however the existing peace clause
will no longer be in force next year, a strategic choice has to be made by Members, and in
particular by the export oriented Members, between two alternative routes that are largely
mutually exclusive : either they believe that multilateral negotiations are the way forward to a
fair and market oriented trading system, or they believe WTO litigation is the way forward.
To conclude, the positions outlined above reflect a considerable movement, largely thanks to
the successive reforms of the CAP. This has been used by the Commission in the
negotiations, but so far, with the exception of the US, to no avail in terms of moving others
away from entrenched positions. The EU should continue to play a full and constructive role,
and will continue to provide positive signals through the continuation of its own internal
reforms in agriculture, as described in recent orientations for reform in cotton, sugar, olive oil,
and tobacco. A successful outcome of the negotiations will however only be possible if other
major players are ready to show the same degree of determination to arrive at a fair
compromise.
Non Agricultural Market Access
Negotiations on tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade in non-agricultural products remain a
priority for EU industry and our fundamental objectives in this area remain sound. This is a
subject in which the EU has significant potential trade gains. The negotiating process leading
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negotiations that were emerging at Cancun could have resulted in rather modest further
market opening overall, with very little balance between the commitment of different WTO
Members. In fact, the proposed modalities were so riddled with exclusions and exemptions,
that they might well have resulted in a very low level of engagement, especially on the part of
some influential developing countries, including the more advanced and competitive among
them. While there is no question of developing countries undertaking market access
commitments resulting in tariff levels similar overall to those of developed countries, the
extent of the imbalance would have denied meaningful market access not only to our
exporters, but to those of other developing countries as well, even though the greatest gains
from further liberalisation will come from more South-South market opening.
Thus, modalities of the type on offer at Cancun – but not accepted by Members - cannot
constitute a balanced basis for progress when negotiations resume. We, and many others, will
have difficulty in moving to a final phase of the negotiations on non-agricultural market
access that does not hold out real prospects of effective improvements in market access for
our exports, in terms of reductions in both bound and applied rates and strict disciplines on
non tariff measures. Nor can we accept an approach that would allow developed country
partners to shelter important sectors from liberalisation. Given that 70% of the trade of
developing countries is in industrial products and that they raise the highest barriers between
themselves, important trade and development benefits will only be found if there is serious
market opening within the developing world, particularly on the part of the more advanced
developing economies, who are perfectly able to make a meaningful contribution. Indeed, the
concern of several weaker developing countries about the impact of preference erosion can to
a considerable extent be mitigated through the creation of new markets for their goods in the
South.
Modalities for resumed non-agricultural market access negotiations must therefore ensure that
the concept of “less than full reciprocity” does not equate to non participation of developing
country Members in the liberalisation process, but instead reflects the genuine capacity of
Members at different levels of development to contribute. As to the question of erosion of
preferences more generally, while there is no easy solution, developed WTO Members should
at the very least pursue some of the EU example, such as duty and quota free access for Least
Developed Countries’ exports or at least minimum overall access for developing countries’
exports. (More on this in the “development” section below).
On this basis, when negotiations resume, the Community should make it clear that the
approach set out in its previous submissions to the negotiating group remain valid. It should
insist on an approach that maintains the justifiably high levels of ambition set out in the Doha
mandate, and which ensures that all Members contribute to this process according to their
level of economic development and capacities. This approach should remain anchored to a
simple, single, non linear tariff reduction formula applied to all tariff lines, and result inter
alia in the elimination of tariff peaks and significant improvements in tariff bindings.
However, it should also cater for sectoral negotiations, over and above the results of a
formula, on products of special interest to developing countries, as well as on other products
of particular EU interest. In this regard, the Community should maintain its proposal to
negotiate, over and above the agreed tariff formula, further reductions in textiles and clothing
tariffs to as close to zero as possible, on a reciprocal basis. The modalities must also
adequately reflect the interest of the Community and many other Members in seeing
meaningful disciplines on non-tariff barriers, and the commitment made by all in Doha to
negotiate the reduction or elimination of market access barriers to environmental goods. The
EU’s aims should remain unchanged in this regard.
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The services’ negotiations are another key priority for the EU and are clearly one of the areas
of the negotiations where the EU has much to gain. Services should therefore be maintained at
the top of the EU’s negotiating agenda. Further opening in services trade offers major
potential benefits, however, not only to the EU but indeed to all countries irrespective of their
levels of development. This opening can and should be entirely consistent with the full
maintenance and protection of public services in the EU and elsewhere. Yet progress in the
negotiations up to Cancun has been very disappointing. Few developing countries have
engaged in the request and offer negotiations, while amongst the developed Members the
quality of offers has been extremely inadequate, with the EU alone among the bigger
Members in making a meaningful offer, including on Mode 4.
A major step change is therefore needed as and when negotiations resume, in order to reflect
adequately the importance of these negotiations in themselves and for the overall balance of
the DDA. To this end, a much greater level of engagement from all WTO Members is needed,
which should be reflected in the submission of meaningful offers by those Members that have
not yet done so, as well as by substantially improvement in the offers already on the table.
The services negotiations should also put greater energy in fulfilling the Doha mandate to
negotiate the reduction or elimination of market access barriers for environmental services.
Developing countries need to take a full part in this effort, in particular by fostering greater
opportunities for South-South trade and by opening further those services sectors that provide
the key infrastructure for economic development and growth. It is only through participation
in the negotiations, not by standing aside, that developing countries can achieve sustainable
growth. Development cooperation can play an important part here, both in identifying
developing countries’ export interests and in assisting them through capacity building
measures to put in place the appropriate regulatory structures and policies important in several
services sectors to ensure a sound regulatory framework within which trade opening can take
place. Obviously the EU will have to continue contribute to this. A new impetus is also
needed in  the negotiations on rule making in services, both in areas of interest for the EU and
developing countries.
Singapore Issues
It is of crucial importance, for developed and developing countries alike, to create optimal
conditions for cross border trade (trade facilitation), to encourage a climate attractive to
productive foreign direct investment, to promote fair competition and of the procurement of
the best goods and services for its citizens at decent prices. There remains deep disagreement
among WTO Members, however, about the appropriateness of making rules on these four
matters at a multilateral level in the WTO and, since Cancun, within the single undertaking of
the DDA.
The EU sees no reason to abandon the fundamental and long run objective of creating rules
for these four issues as key drivers of the global economy. Nor should we shy away, as a
matter of principle, from the WTO as a forum for rule-making.  The question now, therefore,
is how can WTO Members build a shared basis for doing business on these issues in the
WTO.
Some have argued that all four issues should be removed from the DDA, in a bid to “clear the
air”: if the EU  were to accept this, it would set the clock back many years for the essential
development of international rules in these areas. Others have argued that WTO Members
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should settle for negotiations on trade facilitation alone, a subject on which there seems to be
no deep seated opposition, and drop the other items entirely. While this judgement on trade
facilitation may well be true, for the rest, again, we should reject as unacceptable such a
radical shift from the agenda of Doha.
In seeking to build a practical foundation for WTO work on the Singapore issues, the EU
should start therefore from the premise that it remains desirable to pursue the four Singapore
issues within the single undertaking. Yet if, as appears likely, agreement on modalities within
a single undertaking remains elusive, then the WTO must find a way to handle these matters
on some other basis. The EU should therefore explore with an open mind the possibility that
the wish of some WTO members to participate in negotiations on Singapore issues could still
be accommodated, while accepting that others do not take part in or even explicitly exclude
themselves from the negotiations.
The Community should now therefore consider each of the four issues strictly on its own
merits, and no longer insist on each issue being treated identically if there is no consensus to
do so. It should explore the potential for negotiating some, or even all four Singapore issues,
outside the Single Undertaking, and to the extent necessary on the basis of participation in
negotiations and adoption of the final results on a voluntary basis, by interested Members
only. Following this, the Commission will have to assess, based on the level of interest, and
number of countries wishing to take part, whether such negotiations would provide real added
value. And to the extent that implementation of any future commitments remains a real
concern for developing countries, notably the weakest, the Community and other partners
should continue to give priority to technical assistance and development aid in these areas.
Exploring this approach seems to us to be the only way to develop rules on the Singapore
issues while accepting that not all Members  may be ready to take this step now  or in the near
future. It also appears to be the only way that might enable negotiations to be launched on
these subjects while eliminating, once and for all, the false logic of the proposition that the
EU should somehow “pay” for these issues.
Trade and Environment
The relationship between trade liberalisation, trade rule making and action at all levels to
protect the environment lies at the heart of many worries expressed in Europe concerning the
development of the global economy. Some fear that the WTO can become an obstacle to
environment policy making. Other European constituencies fear that over-regulation in the
pursuit of environmental protection is itself becoming an unnecessary, disproportionate and
perhaps protectionist burden for world traders, including for traders in developing countries.
Some trade policy experts argue that there is no real problem in the trade-environment
interface, and yet repeatedly in the last decade this interface has become a focus for
opposition to trade policy making and for concern about global governance. These concerns
are not simply expressed in Europe but world-wide although the EU is among the very few to
have drawn the conclusion that the WTO should clarify these complex issues.
There is no controversy among the members of the WTO as to the importance of environment
protection. There is no controversy as to the need for non protectionist and least trade
restrictive domestic and international regulation in pursuit of environment protection. There
is, however, controversy as to whether anything needs to be done today, in the WTO, in order
to contribute to a better, and mutually supportive, relationship between the trade and
environment legal and policy systems.
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The current relationship between trade and environment legal and policy systems is one of
unstable equilibrium. The findings of the WTO Appellate Body have contributed over the
years to the maintenance of this equilibrium, at least so far. It remains in the interest of the
EU, and remains an important element of the WTO’s pursuit of its sustainable development
goal, to use the Doha mandate on trade and environment issues to make that equilibrium more
stable and predictable. Any other choice would undermine the WTO’s legitimacy and
credibility by demonstrating either a lack of confidence in the trade community’s ability to
handle cross-cutting issues appropriately, or a lack of commitment to the pursuit in the WTO
of the Johannesburg commitments. Given this mandate, the EU cannot accept the extinction
of trade and environment negotiations in the DDA.
On the relationship between the two bodies of international law: Multilateral Environment
Agreements (or MEAs) on the one hand, and the WTO on the other,  the EU has tabled ideas
both for a legal approach to fulfilling this mandate and for broader political concepts, whose
general formal acceptance by the membership could contribute to the definition of a more
stable and mutually supportive interface between trade and environment policies. Without
abandoning either track, given the dynamics in Geneva, it seems useful to focus more on the
political principles for the moment, and to explore whether these could provide the foundation
for progress. This is also the general message that we are receiving from European civil
society.
A focus on governance principles could also have the advantage of providing an “opening” to
a dialogue on ways to improve the dispute settlement mechanism for MEAs through inter alia
better and clearer environmental input from experts, which has been a long standing issue on
the  agenda of the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment (or CTE). In this connection,
possible options to be explored could include more systematic recourse to article 13 DSU
(according to which each panel has the right to seek information and technical advice from
any individual or body which it deems appropriate). The 1996 CTE report to the Singapore
Ministerial already recognised “the benefit of having all relevant expertise available to all
WTO panels in cases involving trade-related environmental measures, including trade
measures taken pursuant to MEA’s”. In addition, the regular invitations by the CTE to certain
key MEA Secretariats to observe negotiating sessions marks a useful improvement of WTO
practice since Doha. However, the DDA mandate on MEA observership, which instructs the
CTE to negotiate criteria for granting observer status for MEA Secretariats, is much broader
than this.  In addition, the CTE debate on this should be held independently from the ongoing
debate in the General Council  on observerships in the WTO, which has made no progress for
a long time (due to the political implications surrounding the status of the Arab League). Our
ideas to deal with that broad DDA mandate have yet to receive detailed analysis in Geneva:
this should be a stronger focus of work from now on.
On market access-related issues, the work on environmental services requires a political push.
On environmental goods, it needs to be made clearer to our trading partners that the EU is
looking for an acceptable outcome reflecting the interests of both developed and developing
countries. There is no question of the EU embarking in some sort of frontal assault on
established orthodoxy in the goods area in Geneva. Nor can there be any question of
importing countries being asked to sacrifice the integrity of their domestic regulatory
autonomy in order to boost imports from other countries in contravention of environmental or
other standards. There should, however, be scope between these extremes for improving the
conditions of trade in environmental goods within the non-agricultural market access
negotiations.
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The EC also intends actively to contribute to discussions on Trade and Environment related
assistance, whether in the CTE or in the Committee on Trade and Development (or CTD)
with the aim of fostering WTO activities in this particular field, in close cooperation with
other international organisations.
In the rules area, the work on subsidies in the fisheries sector is central to our trade and
environment philosophy and also admitted by most to be core business for the WTO. The EU
must continue to be a leading player here.
Finally, the EC should also further consider how to render more operational   paragraph 51
from the Doha Declaration, which instructs the CTD and CTE to act as a forum to identify
and debate developmental and environmental aspects of the negotiations, so as to ascertain
whether and how environmental objectives are being appropriately reflected in the
negotiations.
Geographical Indications
The global economy has not produced global demand for the same product everywhere. On
the contrary, very many products, from food and drink to handicrafts, are crafted to reflect
local strengths and to meet the specific needs of local markets.
The notion that a local product should brand itself on the basis of its provenance is universally
accepted as a potentially useful tool for business development. It even lies at the heart of the
development of wine production in many new global players during the last 20 years. It
equally lies at the heart of rural development policy in many countries, the most notable
recent example being Thailand. So called GIs are a marketing tool, a store of value and a
source of legitimate, proprietary pride for those who produce in a way that builds on the
strength of their local roots. This proposition is widely shared by the developing as well as
developed countries.
More controversial is the best global legal framework within which to empower businesses to
develop GI strategies should they so wish. More controversial still is the potential adjustment
costs where the development of a better legal framework creates not just long-term benefits
for everyone but short-term adjustment challenges for those who may be prevented from
developing certain strategies or required to adjust established strategies.
No one therefore can argue that GIs are a matter of universal consensus. But they are a matter
of global economic potential, and a negotiation to further develop the existing framewok in
the WTO can enable all the players to balance off the costs and benefits so that all can gain.
Three key issues lie before us: whether the current regime for the protection of wines and
spirits GIs, which has stood the test of time since the creation of WTO, can now be developed
over a suitable transitional period through the establishment of a register for all wines and
spirits GIs world-wide. A second issue is whether the tried and tested wines and spirits’
regime should not be extended to other products. Finally, in the agriculture context, there is a
question whether we can address multilaterally the rolling back of certain GI use in countries
where the GI was not originated: this is provided for in the TRIPS agreement, but has so far
been pursued in bilateral and not in multilateral negotiations.
The EU has pursued a clear and coherent commercial strategy on this cluster of issues.
Nevertheless, there continues to be a very substantial gap between the EU’s ambitions in this
field and the willingness of an important number of WTO Members to accept a meaningful
outcome. Since it is clear that the EU cannot accept the proposals of some partners to abandon
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this part of the negotiating agenda agreed at Doha, either in the context of IPR as such, or in
the context of agriculture, we have to intensify our work to build sufficient trust on the part of
our partners to persuade them to show the necessary flexibility. Persuasion and pragmatism
are the tools we need to employ in this task.
The EU has signalled already its willingness to offer significant flexibility as to the precise
arrangements for the creation of a multilateral register.  Our position is clear: we are looking
for a binding register, but with a carefully defined start-up phase of appropriate length.  We
believe that we should be able to bridge the gap with other WTO members, who are currently
limiting their ambitions to a non-binding register with a mechanism for its future evolution
towards full legal status. The launch of negotiations on extension is an important EU
objective in its own right, but is also the key to create broader interest in the overall GI
process in the WTO. Developing countries, in particular, are identifying a growing range of
GIs that could be of interest to them, both at home and on export markets. It will be important
to signal to these countries that the EU will continue to support negotiations on extension of
GI protection that offers developing countries a concrete chance to pursue their own interests
in this field, and not something that is exclusively geared to the protection of EU interests.
As regards the list of GIs transmitted to our partners before Cancun, it is important for the EU
to finalise rapidly any additions needed to take account of enlargement, and to pursue a
reasonable and contained approach to this negotiation. We shall have to make it clear,
however, that the progress on this list is not a substitute for progress on a multilateral register,
or on the extension of IPR protection for other GI products and that all concrete results on
three sets of issues need to be obtained.
Rules, including those covering Regional Trade Agreements
The negotiations on rules (anti dumping, subsidies and regional trade agreements) were not
discussed at Cancun. When work on the DDA resumes, these negotiations should, in
accordance with the Doha mandate, move into a more intensive negotiating phase.
Both on anti dumping and subsidies, the EU continues to have a basic economic interest in
stronger disciplines that will reduce the scope for the rise in protectionist and trade distorting
measures that we have witnessed in recent years. This should remain our approach to
negotiations. The EU has long pursued the aim of balanced trade defence rules, with the
objective of protecting European industry from the effects of unfair practices, but without
falling into the trap of countering a trade distortion with another trade distortion. As a result,
EU trade defence mechanisms have always applied stricter criteria and have included stricter
provisions than those of other WTO Members, and continue to do so (e.g. mechanisms such
as the “lesser duty rule”). The positions taken by other Members on these issues and the
outcome of Cancun only reconfirm the need to negotiate ambitious and trade liberalising
improvements to these rules. Our objectives in the subsidies area are similar, where too we
seek improved and more transparent disciplines, including in the area of fisheries. Here too it
is time to move to a more substantive phase of work.
As regards Regional Trade Agreements, the EU’s experience shows that these agreements,
provided they adhere strictly to the conditions laid down in Articles XXIV GATT and V
GATS, can contribute to the functioning of the multilateral trading system. The recent drift
towards very partial, sector specific “free trade areas” between some Members is, however, a
matter of concern. The EU’s position has been based on the need to clarify the margins of
ambiguity in these rules, so as to strengthen the complementarity of bilateral and regional
liberalisation with multilateral liberalisation. In the wake of Cancun, an increasing number of
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WTO Members appears tempted to pursue RTAs/FTAs as an alternative to multilateral
liberalisation. Worse still, this trend also extends to a number of bilateral tariff agreements,
hitherto justified under the Enabling Clause, the role of which should be re-examained to
ensure that arrangements established under it are brought under stronger multilateral control
and are more transparent This makes it even more imperative to clarify the applicable
standards, and to tighten multilateral scrutiny of these putative RTAs, so as to ensure that any
such agreements are genuinely trade liberalising and supportive of multilateralism, and do not
distort markets, restrict trade with other Members, or undermine MFN-based liberalisation.
The EU should firmly reject any attempt either to weaken the rules governing RTAs or to
argue that they should escape multilateral disciplines in the first place.
More generally the EU has, following Cancun, posed the question as to whether it should now
give more priority to bilateral and regional FTAs. Many WTO Members – including the US
and some Asian developing countries – have announced that they will seek to intensify their
networks of FTA relations in parallel with the WTO negotiations, or as a possible alternative,
given the absence of progress at the multilateral level. The question is whether the EU should
follow suit, or whether a major shift in our policy would disrupt multilateralism or be inimical
to our own interests. The conclusion we draw is that the broad lines of our current policy and
negotiating programme should remain, and that in order not to undermine progress in the
DDA we should be careful not to shift the balance significantly further towards bilateralism.
At the same time we also concluded that this continuity in approach was quite consistent with
a possible expansion of our network of bilateral and regional agreements if persuasive
economic or other reasons present themselves. This will require periodic reassessment.
Development Issues
In the aftermath of Cancun, a number of voices have questioned whether the DDA is truly
capable of delivering its promises for development and/or whether WTO Members are truly
committed to the development dimension of the DDA. The integration of developing
countries into the world economy is a necessary condition for development. Such integration
will be deeper and fairer if anchored in the multilateral trading system. To this end, the
potential of the Doha Development Agenda remains. The process so far has been far from
easy, however, and WTO Members, both developed and developing, have at least partly
fallen into the trap of looking at the development dimension of the DDA through the lenses of
the very narrow notion of “special and differential treatment” that prevailed under the GATT
and that has proven ineffective over the years. The critique of this notion has advanced at the
theoretical level in the WTO, but this has not sufficiently filtered through to the negotiating
process.
The EU should therefore, when negotiations resume, work hard to secure genuinely pro-
development outcomes in all areas of the Doha work programme, in line with the stress
placed on this in earlier Council Conclusions. The lines of action to achieve this outcome
remain those identified by the Commission in the September 2002 Communication on Trade
and Development, and subsequently endorsed by the Council: (a) market access, (b)
multilateral rules, (c) trade-related assistance and capacity building, including the
mainstreaming of trade related assistance into Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and similar
strategies. It is evident that the biggest developmental gains of the DDA will come from
ambitious trade liberalisation and the strengthening of multilateral rules. At the same time
Cancun has shown the persisting limitations to the capacity of the poorer developing countries
to negotiate effectively and in a timely way even on issues of great importance to them.
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As far as market access is concerned, there is an ever growing wealth of evidence, as noted in
the preceding sections of this Communication on agriculture, services and non agricultural
market access, that development gains will only be reaped if developing countries themselves
also make a contribution to the liberalisation process according to their level of development,
and begin to open markets to each other. Economic growth and integration will not take place
through non-participation.
Equally compelling is the evidence that development will also be best served if developing
countries progressively commit themselves to stronger multilateral rules, and benefit from
similar commitments taken by others, rather than by seeking permanent exemption from
WTO disciplines. The original role of exemptions and transitional periods was to allow
developing countries the time to implement rules that should in principle benefit them as
much as they benefit developed countries, but which would in the short term unduly stretch
their resources. This has been all too often forgotten: developing countries have too often
relied on exemptions and transitional periods to postpone indefinitely the assumption of new
obligations. Developed countries have too often found it convenient to grant developing
countries exemptions and transitional periods instead of taking a hard look at whether the
rules being negotiated were indeed suitable for all Members, albeit in different time horizons.
To some extent this philosophy of “special and differential treatment” has been distorted to
the point of identifying the development dimension of the WTO with permanent exclusion of
developing countries from any meaningful obligations, in respect of both market access and
rules. This line of thought has been especially troublesome in the DDA discussion on
implementation and special and differential treatment, which is all the more disturbing, given
the potential of the work programmes on both implementation and special and differential
treatment to contribute to development if they are approached in a rational and critical
manner. It has also spilled through into the negotiations on agriculture and non-agricultural
market access.
The experience of two years of work since Doha suggests that both subjects have lost their
sense of direction and need to be restored onto a firmer footing and with a clearer sense of the
long term objectives driving them. Unless this sense of direction is restored Members of the
WTO will continue to be frustrated about the lack of practical progress on SDT and
implementation. This means at least three things. First, both work programmes will only lead
to serious results if formal negotiations take place. The EU was ready to support negotiations
in Cancun and should remain ready to do so in the context of a re-launched DDA with
satisfactory overall balance, in which negotiating groups should be entrusted with dealing
with each SDT and implementation issue.
Second, a more serious focus should be placed on finding solutions to the problems
experienced by the most vulnerable Members of the WTO – the Least Developed Countries,
small economies, landlocked developing countries and any others particularly vulnerable to
economic shocks or with particularly weak economies or infrastructure, or who remain highly
dependent on preferential access and revenues from tariffs. These Members are in the greatest
need of flexibility in the application of WTO rules, of development aid to remedy supply side
weaknesses, and of measures to improve their access to markets. Work should be guided by
the principle, embodied in the WTO rules, that as Members develop, they would be in a
position to assume greater commitments and make a greater contribution to the multilateral
system. Nor should these commitments be seen merely in terms of mercantilistic exchange
with developed countries. There is no reason, for instance, why at least the more robust
developing economies should not extend to other developing countries tariff preferences, or
extend to Least Developed Countries duty and quota free treatment. The G20 countries could
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be invited to consider what preferences they are ready to extend to the G90 countries. Such
improved access, together with support for supply-side reforms will mitigate the impact, if
any, of reductions in margins of preference brought about by further multilateral trade
liberalisation.
Third, as regards the negotiation of greater flexibility for developing countries in the
application of WTO rules – which is the core of the SDT work programme – the EU should
only support the principle of permanent waivers or exemptions from basic WTO provisions in
exceptional cases, limited to the LDCs and other similarly weak Members of the organisation,
and where this helps, rather than hampers, development.
Last but not least, it is not enough that the EU and Member States re-affirm their strong
commitment – political and financial – to trade-related assistance and capacity building, in the
WTO and elsewhere. This is an obviously necessary condition, but far from a sufficient one.
The WTO Technical Assistance programme has suffered from a number of teething problems,
from a mismatch between the financial resources committed by WTO Members and the
organisational and human resources capacity of the WTO itself to implement it, as well as
from insufficiently clear political guidance from WTO Members as to the strategic direction
of the programme.
Assurances need to be repeated as to the continuity of the financial commitment of developed
countries. However, the EU should also press for the WTO as an organisation to be given the
tools to do the job, beginning with more and better human resources. The WTO must become
better at identifying the needs of developing countries in this area, relying more on the work
of WTO bodies and Committees, including specific input from the Trade Policy Review
process, and bearing in mind that those developing countries who are in greater need of
assistance are those least able to articulate convincingly those needs. The focus of WTO-led
trade-related assistance must shift from explanation and awareness raising to tackling in the
very short-term the very real lack of negotiating capacity and ability to participate in WTO
work, and laying the foundations for the implementation of future WTO agreements, together
with other multilateral institutions and bilateral donors.
Improvements to the Functioning of the WTO
Finally, although as noted above the failure of the Cancun ministerial was due largely to
substantive differences amongst Members, important organisational and procedural
shortcomings also contributed to the breakdown. WTO Members have begun to recognise
that, unless these organisational shortcomings are quickly remedied, they will continue to
impede any future efforts to resume, conduct and conclude negotiations. The EU for its part,
has asked the – far from rhetorical – question as to whether improvements are needed to the
functioning of the WTO. The EU should now put forward a number of improvements, notably
to improve the preparation and management of ministerial conferences, with the aim of
facilitating more efficient negotiations and decision making amongst an ever-growing
membership. In doing so, the EU has focussed on changes that could be introduced rapidly,
without changing the basic rules or constitution of the WTO, and without distracting in any
way from the substantive negotiations.  For instance, it should be possible to agree in the short
term to a better definition of the role of the host of Ministerial conferences, or on the need to
appoint “facilitators” at Ministerial level earlier in the process.  Equally, there is a need to
improve the ability of smaller (and non-resident) delegations to negotiate effectively both in
the Geneva process and at Ministerial meetings: technical assistance is certainly part of the
solution here. The EU should raise the above mentioned proposals in the WTO in the coming
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weeks so as to ensure that the necessary changes in organisation and procedure are put in
place in good time and actually facilitate the building of consensus, rather than hinder it.
Conclusions
This paper attempts to draw comprehensive conclusions from the Commission’s consultation
and reflection over the last two months, taking full account of views expressed  in the 133
Committee, by Members of the European Parliament and elsewhere. It also responds to the
request of the European Council that the EU reflect on its multilateral strategy as part of an
effort to relaunch the Doha Round. It has tried to identify, in relation to the different areas of
the DDA, the actions needed from ourselves and from our trading partners, who also need to
show their commitment to the negotiating process. And this document tries to provide an
answer at least in part to the four basic questions posed by the Commission shortly after the
failure of the Cancun meeting.
The Commission believes that the approaches outlined in this paper will enable the EU to
play its role in getting negotiations back on track, and this time on a more solid basis. This
must be our objective. Following further discussions in the Council and the European
Parliament on the approach, and taking account of any views expressed, it would be the
intention of the Commission to use the approach set out in this document as a basis on which,
in cooperation with our WTO partners, to seek a relaunch of the Doha negotiations.
